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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER G. H E N D E R S O N and 
HELEN L. HENDERSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HARRY R. MEYER and RONALD 
EUGENE MEYER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict 
in the Second Judicial District Count in and for Davis 
County, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge. 
The verdict returned and judgment thereon found no 
cause of action by plaintiffs against either defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter came on regularly for jury trial before 
the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, District Judge, on 
March 21, 1974. Upon hearing, the jury returned a 
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verdict of no cause of action against either defendant, 
and judgment was duly entered by the trial court ac-
cordingly. Subsequently, plaintiffs, by and through coun-
sel, filed a Motion for Judgment N. 0. V. or in the Al-
ternative for a New Trial. Said Motion was denied by 
the trial court after hearing on April 30, 1974. On May 
30, 1974, plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal in this action, 
and the case is now before this Honorable Court pursuant 
to that Notice of Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's Verdict 
and Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought to recover for personal in-
juries and property damage sustained by pkintiffs-appel-
lants in a two-car accident which occurred on April 22, 
1972, on Second West Street between Fourth and Fifth 
South Streets in Bountiful, Utah. The accident occurred 
when a northbound pickup truck, operated by defendant 
Ronald Eugene Meyer and owned by defendant Harry 
R. Meyer, collided with the rear-end of a northbound 
vehicle operated by plaintiff Helen L. Henderson and 
owned by plaintiff Walter G. Henderson. 
At trial, substantial credible and uncontroverted evi-
dence was adduced by plaintiffs, including testimony 
and admissions from defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer, 
requiring the clear conclusion that the above-described 
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accident directly and proximately resulted from the negli-
gence of defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer (Tr. 52-60). 
Such evidence was not rebutted by defendant. 
At the conclusion of presentation of evidence in this 
case, plaintiffs moved the trial court for a directed ver-
dict in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants by sub-
mission of plaintiffs' Requested Jury Instruction No. 1, 
which instruction was not given by the court. (The full 
text of this proposed instruction is reproduced under 
Point I of the Argument portion of this Brief.) Plaintiffe 
duly excepted to the failure of the trial court to grant 
such Motion and provide such Instruction. 
Subsequent to the giving of the court's mstructions, 
the jury retired for deliberation and later returned a ver-
dict of no cause of action, and judgment thereon was 
duly entered. 
Subsequent to entry of judgment, plaintiffs moved 
the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 50 (b) 
and 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a judg-
ment n. o. v. or in the alternative for a new trial. The 
trial court by order denied such motion after hearing on 
April 30, 1974. On May 30, 1974, plaintiffe filed Notice 
of Appeal in this action, and the case is now before this 
Honorable Court pursuant to that Notice of Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
P O I N T ! 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
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FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
At the conclusion of evidence in the instant case, 
plaintiffs moved the trial court for a directed verdict in 
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants by and through 
the submission of plaintiffs' Requested Jury Instruction 
No. 1. Said instruction provided: "You are instructed 
to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff Helen L. Hender-
son and against the defendants on the issue of liability." 
The trial court did not give plaintiffs' Requested 
Instruction No. 1, assigning no reason for its refusal. Upon 
the return of the jury verdict of no cause of action herein, 
plaintiffs again moved the trial court, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
for a judgment n. o. v. or in the alternative a new trial. 
The trial court denied such motion upon hearing thereof 
on April 30,1974. 
I t is clear, under the facts of this case, that the 
refusal by the trial court to give such instruction and 
to grant plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict and 
to grant plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., or in 
the Alternative for a New Trial, constituted clear error, 
and that the error is of such magnitude as to require a 
reversal and remand of this case to the trial court for 
a new trial or other appropriate action. 
I t is well established as a matter of law that a Mo-
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tion for a Directed Verdict and a Motion for Judgment 
N. 0. V. properly lie and should be granted by the trial 
court in a case where there are no controverted issues of 
fact upon which reasonable men could differ, and where, 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there 
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. 
Brady v. Southern Railroad, 320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 
232, 88 L. Ed. 329 (1943); Shafer v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Telegraph Co., 335 R 2d 444 (9th Cir.. 1964); 
Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Larimer, 352 F. 2d 9 (8th Cir. 
1965); Patterson v. Pizitz, Inc., 353 F. 2d 267 (5th Cir. 
1965); Jopek v. New Court Central Railroad, 353 F. 2d 
778 (3rd Cir. 1965); Herron v. Maryland Gas Co., 3457 
F. 2d 357 (5th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Powell, 351 F. 2d 
213 (10th Cir. 1965); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlumowitz, 351 
F. 2d 509 (4th Cir. 1965); 5A Moore's Federal Practice, 
§ 50.02(1) et seq. See also, Pence v. United States, 316 
U. S. 332, 62 S. Ct. 1080, 86 L. Ed. 1510 (1942) and 
Pollesche v. TransAmerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 
497 P. 2d 236 (1972). 
In the leading case of Brady v. Southern Railroad, 
supra, the United States Supreme Court had before it 
the question of when and under what circumstances a 
Motion for a Directed Verdict is properly granted. In 
that landmark case, the Supreme Court announced the 
standard in the following terms: 
When the evidence is such that without 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there 
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the 
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verdict, the court should determine the proceed-
ings by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in 
accordance with the applicable practice without 
submission to the jury, or by judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. By such direction of 
the trial the result is saved from mischance of 
speculation over legally unfounded claims (320 
U.S . at 479-480). 
5A Moore's Federal Practice, § 50.02(1) states the 
above rule in somewhat more succinct fashion: 
Although the language of the opinions con-
cerning directed verdicts is extremely varied, it 
is now clear that a verdict will normally be di-
rected where both the facts and the inferences 
to be drawn from the facts point so strongly in 
favor of one party that the court believes that 
reasonable men could not come to a different 
conclusion (At p. 2320). 
I t is now well established, in applying the above 
rule, that an appellate court, in reviewing the action of 
a lower court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict, must 
consider the evidence in its strongest light in favor of 
the party against whom the Motion for Directed Verdict 
was made, and give him the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify. 
Upon such a consideration, if the appellate court con-
cludes that the facts adduced in evidence and the infer-
ences to be drawn from the facts point to any conclusion 
so strongly that the court concludes that reasonable men 
could not come to a different conclusion, the appellate 
court is justified in overturning any ruling by the trial 
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court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict which is adverse 
to or contra that required conclusion. Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 82 S. Ct. 1404, 
8 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1962); Webb v. Illinois Central Rail-
road, 352 U. S. 512, 77 S. Ct. 451, 1 L. Ed. 503 (1957); 
Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 
(1963) ;Schnee v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 186 F. 2d 
745 (9th Cir. 1951); Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 
P. 2d 284. 
Applying the above cases and authority to the case 
at bar, it is clear that the trial court erred in refusing 
to grant plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict and 
plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V. In this case, 
the facts adduced at trial and the inferences appropriately 
drawn from those facts, point so strongly in favor of the 
plaintiffs that it is inconceivable that reasonable men, 
in considering those facts, could conclude other than that 
plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict and judgment against 
defendants. 
In the instant case, the undisputed facts disclosed 
at trial reveal that the accident which is the subject 
matter of this lawsuit occurred on Second West Street 
between Fourth and Fifth South Streets in Bountiful, 
Utah, when a northbound pickup truck, operated by de-
fendant Ronald Eugene Meyer and owned by defendant 
Harry R. Meyer, collided with the rear-end of a north-
bound vehicle operated by plaintiff Helen R. Henderson 
and owned by plaintiff Walter G. Henderson. Upon trial, 
the defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer made what is tan-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tamount to a clear admission of liability and culpability 
in the events surrounding the accident. Upon the witness 
stand he testified that immediately prior to the accident 
and while proceeding northward on Second West Street 
he observed a vehicle approaching the roadway on which 
he was proceeding. He testified that he observed such 
vehicle up to and until he reached its location, thinking 
that it was going to pull out onto Second West Street 
where he was proceeding. After passing such vehicle 
he testified that he turned his head and looked out the 
rear window of his truck for some time prior to his 
collision with plaintiffs' vehicle. 
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF RONALD EU-
GENE MEYER: 
Q. Do you recall stating to the investigat-
ing officer in the presence of Mrs. Henderson in 
the officer's car that you speeded up when it 
appeared to you that this white car was per-
haps coming onto the roadway? 
A. No. I don't recall that. 
Q. Do you believe that you did make such 
a statement? 
A. No. 
Q. And you don't have a present recollec-
tion of having speeded up? 
A. I am sure that I didn't. 
Q. All right. As you passed the driveway, 
did you make any observation to the side or to 
the rear of this stopped white Rambler? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. Yes. I looked over my shoulder after 
out the rear window. 
Q. All right. This is the rear window of 
the pickup? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Pickup truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the rear window is right behind 
your shoulder in the pickup truck? 
A. Just like that (indicating). 
Q. Did you turn your head to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of course, during that time you were 
unable to observe forward on Second West then 
to the north of your position. Do you have 
a recollection how long a period of time you 
spent with your head turned looking at this 
stopped Rambler? 
A. Oh, it was a time, just a few seconds 
I guess. 
Q. Do you think maybe three seconds, four 
seconds? 
A. Oh, I wouldn't know. 
Q. Give us your best recollection of the 
number of seconds. 
A. It was just mainly as I passed him. 
Q. Was there any reason to look at him in 
view of the fact that you knew that he was 
stopped and no danger to you as you passed? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. Just to see what — I don't know. 
Q. You were curious? 
A. I guess. 
Q. Did you recognize him or the driver of 
this car? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. Let's take it from the time 
that your head is turned looking out the back 
window at this white Rambler, tell us in your 
own words what happened from that point up 
to the time of the impact? 
A. Well, when I looked around I seen the 
car stopped, so I just applied my brakes and 
turned the wheel to the one side. 
Q. All right. Now, how far were you from 
the Henderson vehicle when you first observed 
it? 
A. I couldn't say for sure. 
Q. Obviously not far enough to stop? 
A. Well, yes. 
Q. And you made no observation of it prev-
ious to that time? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you at that time observe the turn 
signal or brake lights on that vehicle? 
A. Well, no. I was too busy stopping. I 
didn't — I couldn't see. 
Q, Were you able to change the direction 
of your truck at all before the impact? 
A. No. It just slid kind of sideways. 
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Q. Did the Henderson vehicle appear to 
be stopped when you first observed it? 
A. Yes, 
Q. What did it appear that it was doing 
or attempting to do? 
A. Just as I can recall, it appeared like it 
was just coming to a stop. The back bumper of 
it was just a little high. 
Q. You are not sure whether it was actually 
stopped or stopping? 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. All right. Did you have any conversa-
tion with Mrs. Henderson after this impact oc-
curred? 
A. Well, I got out and went and asked her 
if she was all right, and if the girl was all right, 
and she said after a while, "I think I'm all right," 
but she was rubbing her neck. 
Q. Did you hear her complain of any pain in 
her neck, back or head at the scene of the acci-
dent? 
A. She complained of headache in the pa-
trol car. 
Q. Are you personally familiar at all with 
the progress of her injuries since the date of 
the accident and until the present time, do you 
have any personal knowledge how she's coming 
along? 
A. Just what I heard from the lawyers. 
From the above, it should be abundantly clear that 
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defendant Ronald Eugene Meyer's negligence was clearly 
established as a matter of fact and law merely from his 
own testimony and admissions. Moreover, when the 
other evidence in the case is considered, there is such a 
mass of credible and uncontroverted evidence that no 
other reasonable conclusion is possible. Certainly no 
appreciable or legally-sufficient evidence was adduced re-
quiring the conclusion that plaintiff Helen L. Henderson 
was sufficiently negligent or contributorily negligent to 
justify the verdict returned by the jury in this matter 
and the subsequent judgment entered thereon by the trial 
court, or that any other appreciable legal defense for said 
defendant's actions exists. Thus, the trial court com-
mitted dear error in denying plaintiffs' Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and thereby permitting this case to go 
to the jury on the liability issue. Further, the trial court 
committed dear error, for substantially the same reason, 
is denying plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., or 
in the Alternative for a New Trial. This Court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the 
case for appropriate proceedings. 
POINT II. 
THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS MADE 
BY THE JURY IN THIS CASE WERE 
AGAINST THE WEIGHT AND PREPOND-
ERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND CLEAR-
LY ERRONEOUS. 
Even assuming, arguendo that the trial court did not 
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err in refusing to grant plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed 
Verdict and plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., it 
is clear that the factual determinations made by the jury 
in the instant case were clearly and manifestly erroneous 
and inconsistent with the weight of evidence adduced at 
trial. As a result, this Court should reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial 
or other appropriate proceedings. 
It is clear that an appellate court, in considering and 
reviewing the correctness and propriety of a ruling by 
a lower court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict and 
Motion for Judgment N. 0. V. is required to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against 
whom the Motion was made. An appellate court also 
possesses, however, power to review the evidence gen-
erally to determine whether there in any substantia! 
evidence supportive of the verdict of the trier of fact 
or whether the determinations made by the trier of fact 
are so manifestly against the weight and preponderance 
of the evidence adduced at trial as to require reversal. 
See cases cited supra. See also, Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ot. 266, 83 L. Ed. 126 
(1938); Riggs v. U. S., 280 F. 2d 949 (5th Cir. 1960); 
Terminal Railroad Assoc, v. Fitzjohn, 165 F. 2d 473 (8th 
Cir. 1948). 
In the instant case, even the most cursory review 
of the evidence adduced at trial discloses that the ver-
dict of the jury was manifestly against the weight and 
preponderance of the evidence. (See the discussion of 
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the evidence provided in Point I of the Argument portion 
of this Brief.) The verdict of the jury in this case so 
flies in the face of all the evidence adduced and is so 
plainly inexplicable and unjustifiable that it should as-
tound even the most experienced judge. Appellants can 
only conclude that the verdict was a product of passion 
or prejudioe against the plaintiffs. This Court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this 
case to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiffs-
appellants' Motion for a Directed Verdict and plaintiffs-
appellants' Motion for Judgment N. O. V., or in the 
Alternative for a New Trial. Moreover, the verdict of 
the jury in the instant case was against the weight and 
preponderance of the evidence and clearly erroneous. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand this case to the district court for ap-
propriate proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS A. JONES 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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